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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM D. MILLETT, 
Plaintiff-Appel I ant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH - BOARD OF REVIEW, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 16385 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended, for the purpose of judicial review of a decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, affirm-
ing the decision of the Appeal Referee, which denied benefits to 
the Plaintiff for a period of sixty-two (62) weeks and assessed 
an overpayment in the amount of $1,785.00, on the grounds the 
Plaintiff knowingly withheld material facts regarding work and 
earnings in order to receive benefits to which he was not 
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entitled. The questions are whether the Findings of Fact are 
supported by the evidence and whether the law was properly 
applied in the instant case. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the decision of the Board of 
Review that Plaintiff was not eligible for unemployment compen-
sation during the period in question and that the overpayment 
in the amount of $1,785.00 be set aside. Defendant seeks affirm-
ance of the decision of the Board of Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant agrees with the dates and sequence of events set 
forth in Plaintiff's statement of Facts. However, inasmuch as 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts also contains considerable com-
ment as to Plaintiff's state of mind and his interpretation of 
the law, Defendant offers the following summary of the facts: 
Plaintiff filed his initial claim for unemployment compensation 
effective January 22, 1978. (R.0001, 0010) He thereafter filed 
weekly claims for benefits through February 25, 1978. Plaintiff 
reopened his claim effective July 2, 1978 and continued to file 
claims through September 30, 1978. Plaintiff received a total 
of $2,053.00 in unemployment compensation. (R.0010) 
Plaintiff began working for Rhead Realty Construction on 
February 12, 1979. He earned $121.00 during the week ended 
February 18, 1979 and $220.00 during the week ended February 25, 
1979. (R.0004) Plaintiff filed claims for each of the weeks 
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ended February 18 and February 25, 1978,certifying thereon that 
he had no work or earnings by placing the word "none" in the 
space provided on each claim for reporting earnings. (R. 0002, 
0003) Plaintiff received payment from Rhead Realty Construction 
for his work during the week ended February 18, 1978 on or 
before February 24, 1978, as evidenced by the paycheck which was 
paid by the issuing bank on February 24, 1978. (R. 0004, 0005); 
Plaintiff also admits in his brief at page 3 that he received a 
check on February 24, 1978. He was paid for the week ended 
February 25, 1978 on or before March 10, 1978, the date on which 
the issuing bank paid that check. (R. 0004, 0006) 
On November 14, 1978, a telephone hearing was conducted by 
Department Representative at Plaintiff's request. The Depart-
ment Representative found that Plaintiff had violated Section 
35-4-5(e) of the Utah Employment Security Act and disqualified 
the Plaintiff for a period of 52 weeks from February 12, 1978 
to February 10, 1979,and established an overpayment in the 
amount of $1,785.00, representing the benefits received by 
Plaintiff during the disqualification period. (R. 0008) 
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Hearing Representa-
tive on November 30, 1978. (R.0009) After an in-person hear-
ing before an Appeals Referee, the decision of the Hearing 
Representative was affirmed. CR. 0022, 0023) Upon further 
appeal, the Board of Review of the- Industrial Conunission of 
Utah affirmed the decisions of the Appeal Referee and the Hear-
ing Representative in case number 78-A-3045, 79-BR-04. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
THE COURT WILL AFFIRM THE COMMISSION FINDINGS IF 
SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE, 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is 
well established. Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
provides in part: 
In any judicial proceedings under this section 
the findings of the Commission and the Board of 
Review as to the facts if supported by evidence 
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said 
Court shall be confined to questions of law. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of 
the Commission and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, 
they will not be disturbed. Ma:r>tinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 
131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). A reversal of an order of the Depart-
ment denying compensation can only be justified if there is no 
substantial evidence to sustain the determination and the facts 
giving rise to a right to compensation are so persuasive that the 
Department's denial was clearly capricious, arbitrary and unreason-
able. Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Depa:r>tment of Employment 
Security, 13 U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); Gocke v. Wiesley, 18 U. 
2d 245, 420 P. 2d 44, 45 (1966). This Court stated in Members of 
Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 104, Utah 242, 248; 
139 P. 2d 208, 211, (1943), that: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to 
sustain the findings and decision of the Indus-
trial Commission, this Court may not set aside 
the decision even though on a review of the 
record we might well have reached a different 
result. 
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This Court has adhered to the same standard of review in 
cases involving violation of Section 35-4-5(e) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. Deaker v. Industrial Corrmission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Semirity, 533 P. 2d 898 (1975); Whitaome v. 
Department of Employment Security, Industrial Corrmiss1'.on of Utah, 564 P. 2d 
1116 (1977). 
POINT II 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW HAVE 
PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE INTENT OF THE UTAH STATE 
LEGISLATURE WITH RESPECT TO SECTIONS 35-4-5(e), 6(d) 
AND 6(e), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, 
Sections 35-4-5(e), 6(d), and 6(e), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, provide: 
35-4-5 - An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing 
a waiting period: 
(e) For the week with respect to which 
he had willfully made a false statement 
or representation or knowingly failed to 
report a material fact to obtain any ben-
efit under the provisions of this act, and 
for the 51-week period immediately follow-
ing and until he has repaid to the fund all 
monies he received by reason of his fraud 
and which he received during such follow-
ing 51-week disqualification period, 
provided that determinations under this 
subsection shall be made only upon a sworn 
written admission, or after due notice and 
recorded hearing; provided that when a 
claimant waives the recorded hearing a 
determination shall be made based upon all 
of the facts which the commission, exercis·-
ing due diligence, has been able to obtain; 
and provided further that such determination 
shall be appealable in the manner provided 
by this act for appeals from other benefit 
determinations. 
35-4-o(d) - Any person who, by reason of his fraud, 
has received any sum as benefits under this 
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act to which he was not entitled shall be 
liable to repay such sum to the commission 
for the fund. If any person, by reason of his 
own fault, has received any sum as benefits 
under this act to which under a redeter-
mination or decision pursuant to this sect-
ion, he has been found not entitled, he shall 
be liable to repay such sum, and/or shall, in 
the discretion of the commission, be liable to 
have such sum deducted from any future bene-
fits payable to him. In any case in which 
under this subsection a claimant is liable 
to repay to the commission any sum for the 
fund, such sum shall be collectible in the 
same manner as provided for contributions 
due under this act. 
(e) If any person has received any sum as 
benefits under this act to which under a 
redetermination or decision he was not entitled, 
and it has been found that he was without fault 
in the matter, he is not liable to repay such 
sum but shall be liable to have such sum deducted 
from any future benefits payable to him with 
respect to the benefit year current at the time 
of such receipt. 
Plaintiff contends that the Department, the Board of Review 
and the Utah Supreme Court have improperly interpreted the intent 
of the Utah State Legislature in its enactment of Section 35-4-5(e), 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (See Plaintiff's Brief, 
Points I, III and IV.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that 
prior to 1959, the Section 5(e) disqualification period related 
to the other disqualification periods contained in the Utah 
E~ployment Security Act, such as for voluntary leaving, discharge, 
or failure to accept suitable work. The Employment Security Act 
was, in fact, amended in 1949 to change the penalty for fraud 
from a variable two to ten week disqualification to a uniform 
fifty-two week disqualification. The Act was also amended to 
increase the penalty period for discharge for dishonesty consti-
tuting a crime from a variable two to ten week disqualification 
to a uniform fifty-two week disqualification. 
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The legislative history of the 1949 amendments to the 
Employment Security Act (designated as House Bill 166) is 
inadequate to determine whether the legislature intended the 
penalty period for Section 35-4-5(e) to be co-extensive with 
the penalty periods provided elsewhere in the Act. (See 
House and Senate Journals for 1949.) While it is true that 
a violation of Section 5{e) must be based on a misrepresenta-
tion or omission made material by the other provisions of the 
Act, there is nothing contained in the Employment Security 
Act which can be construed to require or even suggest that the 
disqualification for fraud should be limited to a period of 
time equal to the disqualification period of the section of 
law from which materiality is derived. On the contrary, all 
of the disqualification periods set forth in Section 5 of the 
Employment Security Act remained variable with the exceptions of 
the penalties for fraud and discharge for dishonesty constituting 
a crime. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the legis-
lature intended to establish only a set and harsh penalty for 
each of these infractions, without reference to any other dis-
qualification period. 
Stated simply, the present interpretation of Sections 
35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) is that an individual who commits a 
fraud upon the Unemployment Compensation Fund invokes the full 
administrative penalty of fifty-two weeks disqualification. He 
is further denied the right to receive any unemployment benefits 
until he has repaid all money received during the fifty-two weeks 
disqualification. 
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Although administrative or legislative construction of 
statutes may provide some aid in interpretation, it is ulti-
mately the responsibility of the judicial branch of the govern-
ment to construe laws enacted by the legislature. (See 7 3 Am. Jur. 
2nd, Statutes, Section 142.) There is no question that the 
penalty for fraud can be harsh. This point was well stated in 
the case of Decker v. Industrial Commission (Utah, 1975) 533 P. 2d 
898, 899, in which this Court held: 
Plaintiff also complains that the depriva-
tion of fifty-two weeks of benefits is a 
severe penalty. With this we are inclined 
to agree. However, under the statute it 
does not appear that the fact finder or 
this court has the discretion to reduce or 
forgive any part of the penalty. 
The Court then went on to comment that the overpayment is gov-
erned by Section 35-4-6(d). 
This position was confirmed by the holding of the Court in 
Whiteome v. Department of Emrloyment Seeurity (Utah 1977) 564 P. 2d 
111~ 1117, wherein the Court stated: 
It should be noted that one known false state-
ment or known failure to report a material fact 
to obtain a benefit is sufficient to invoke this 
section of the Act and that the fifty-two week 
disqualification then takes effect and weekly 
benefits thereafter received within the disquali-
fication period although pursuant to submission 
of perfectly honest weekly claim forms are over-
payments and must be repaid to the Department. 
In this reqard it is interesting to note that the Employment 
Security Act makes no distinction between "simple" fraud and 
"compound" fraud, as Plaintiff attempts to do at page 14 of his 
Brief. 
In the recent case of Diprizio v. Industrial Commission, (Utah, 
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1977), 572 P. 2d 679, 681, Mr. Chief Justice Ellett, speaking 
for the majority, wrote: 
If a discretion is to be given to the Commiss-
ion to ignore or modify an unambiguous statute, 
then that should be done by the legislature and 
not by this Court. 
Although Mr. Justice Crockett dissented in Dipr1:zio on the grounds 
that some exercise of discretion is necessary to achieve indivi-
dualized justice, (572 P. 2d, at page 682) he has subsequently 
acknowledged that the decisions in Deaker and Diprizio now cons ti-
tute the law in this area. Mr. Justice Crockett's position is 
consistent with the generally acknowledged principle that once a 
statutory construction has been made and followed it should not 
be altered. (73 Am.JuL 2d, Statutes, Section 143.) 
It should also be noted in this regard that in construing 
a statute it is proper to consider the particular evils at which 
the legislation is aimed. (73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, Section 157.) 
In responding to this specific issue once before, this Court stated: 
Neither are we persuaded by the Plaintiff's 
further argument that because the order made 
is so severe and arbitrary that it runs con-
trary to and defeats the purpose of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Act that it should be 
unconditionally reversed and no further con-
sideration be given it. It is true of course 
that the general purpose of that act is to 
alleviate the burdens that result on indivi-
duals and upon the economy generally because 
of the hardships of unemployment. But it is 
equally true that the act and the funding which 
supports it must be protected against unjust-
ified claims of persons who would prefer unem-
ployment benefits to employment, and who engage 
in various artifices including falsification 
and fraud to obtain benefits. In order to 
carry out the salutary purposes of the act, it 
is necessary not only that there is a means of 
obtaining reimbursement but also of penalizing 
those who would so of fend. (Diprizio v. Industrial 
Commission, Supra, at p. 680.) 
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Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 5(e) would render 
a nullity of any penalty except in those cases where the fraud 
is discovered at its inception, for certainly the individual 
who is required after the fact to repay only those monies 
obtained by reason of his fraud suffers no penalty whatsoever. 
Such would be the situation in the instant case were Plaintiff's 
interpretation of Sections 35-4-5(e) and 35-4-6(d) to be adopted 
by this Court. 
Plaintiff cites two prior Board of Review cases in support 
of the proposition that the Industrial Commission does give some 
interpretation to Section 35-4-5(e). Without belaboring the fact 
that it is the responsibility of the Industrial Commission to 
provide some small degree of interpretation to the provisions 
of law the Commission must administer, it is sufficient to point 
out that neither case cited by Plaintiff is material to the 
instant matter. In case No. 65-BR-395 the Hearing Representative 
erroneously calculated the overpayment. When he tried to correct 
the overpayment by amending his decision, the Board of Review 
ruled that the original decision had become final and the Hearing 
Representative had no jurisdiction to consider the matter further. 
Thus, Case No. 65-BR-395 involved an issue of jurisdiction, 
rather than interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e). 
Case No. 75-BR-90 involves an attempt by the Board of Review 
to ameliorate the effects of the penalty contained in Section 
35-4-5(e), consistent with the wording of that section and the 
intent of the statute. The Board of Review held that while a 
claimant who had been found in violation of Section 35-4-5(e) 
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could not receive benefits, he could file claims after the 
initial fifty-two weeks disqualification, which claims, if 
otherwise eligible, might be used to offset his overpayment. 
The penalty is not reduced or forgiven in any part. The 
fifty-two weeks disqualification must be served and the full 
overpayment must be repaid. However, repayment may be accom-
plished by filing of valid claims after expiration of the 
disqualification period. The Industrial Commission recognizes 
that the Court may, in an appropriate case, conclude that such 
an approach is or is not consistent with the plain meaning of 
Section 35-4-5(e). However, adjudication of this question 
must await an appropriate case in which the Commission's position 
is actually at issue. 
POINT III 
SECTION 35-4-5(E), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, 
IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION OR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff cites Dandridge v. WiUicuns, 397 U.S. 471 (1971), in 
reference to the requirement of equal protection that any legisla-
tive distinction between classes must bear some rational relation-
ship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Plaintiff asserts that 
Section 35-4-5(e) creates two classes of individuals: (1) those 
who receive unemployment benefits during the penalty period and 
must repay those benefits, and (2) those individuals who receive 
no such benefits during the penalty period and therefore have no 
repayment requirement. 
11 
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In the Dandridge case, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
In the area of economics and social welfare, 
a State does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause merely because the classifications made 
by its laws are imperfect. If the classifica-
tion has some 'reasonable' basis,' it does not 
offend the Constitution simply because the 
classification ~s not made with mathematical 
nicety or because in practice it results in 
some inequality.' 'The problems of government 
are practical ones and may justify, if they do 
not require, rough accommodations - illogical 
it may be, and unscientific.' 'A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any 
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to 
justify it.' (Citations omitted, 397 U. s., at 
p. 485.) 
The only two classes of individuals created by the Utah 
Employment Security Act are those who are eligible to receive 
unemployment benefits and those who are not eligible. The Legis-
lature has a legitimate concern in preventing fraud on the Unem-
ployment Compensation Fund by penalizing those who engage in such 
activity. ( Diprizio v. Industr-;aZ Commission, supra. ) As in the Dandridge 
case, the effects of the statute may be felt more harshly by some 
than by others. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Dandridge: 
The Equal Protection Clause does not require 
a State to choose between attacking every 
aspect of a problem [viz unemployment fraud] 
or not attacking the problem at all. (Dandridge 
v. Williams, supra, at p. 486.) 
In this regard it is important to note that under Plaintiff's 
proposed interpretation of Section 35-4-5(e), there would be no 
penalty for fraud except to the extent the fraud can be discov-
ered prior to the expiration of the statutorily set fifty-two 
weeks disqualification period. In all cases where benefits are 
received for weeks subsequent to the act of fraud there would be 
12 
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no repayment requirement. In those instances where the fraud 
is not discovered until after the expiration of the fifty-two 
weeks disqualification period, the claimant would be required 
merely to repay the money obtained by reason of his fraud. 
In addition, two classes of claimants would again be estab-
lished under Section 35-4-5(e): (1) those whose fraud is dis-
covered in time to make them subject to disqualification for the 
balance of the fifty-two weeks penalty period, l2) and those whose 
fraud is not discovered until after the fifty-two weeks penalty 
period has expired. The latter class would have the advantage of 
being able to receive benefits during the disqualification period 
while the former class might not. 
It is apparent that Plaintiff's interpretation of Section 
5(e) provides no meaningful solution to the problems of the legis-
lature in attempting to provide a significant protection for the 
Unemployment Compensation Fund. This is clearly the type of 
legislative provision that falls within the doctrine of the 
Dandridge case. 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW AND THE 
APPEAL REFEREE DID NOT ERR JN DETERMINING THAT 
PLAINTIFF KNOWINGLY WITHHELD MATERIAL INFORMATION 
JN ORDER TO OBTAIN BENEFITS TO WHICH HE WAS NOT 
ENTITLED, 
It has previously been held that intention to defraud is 
inherent in the claims themselves when such claims contain false 
statements and fail to set forth material information required 
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by statute. Martinez v. Industrial Commission, (Utah, 1978) 576 P. 2d 
1295. The filing of such a claim is in and of itself a manisfes-
tation of intent to defraud. Mincer v. Board of llevie1,; of the Industrial 
Commission of Utnh, (Utah, 1977) 572 P. 2d 1364. 
In the instant case the Plaintiff contends that he began 
working for Rhead Realty Construction on a trial basis for which 
he did not expect to be paid. (R.0017; Plaintiff's Brief, page 3.) 
Plaintiff received his first paycheck on or before February 24, 
1978, (R.0004) and he cashed it on February 24, 1978 (R.0005) 
Yet, on February 28, 1978, just four days after cashing his pay-
check, the Plaintiff filed his claim for unemployment benefits, 
certifyinc; "ncne" in the space provided for reporting his earnings. 
(R.0003) 
Furthermore, when asked why he did not report his hours of 
work as required by Item 2.b. of the claim card, Plaintiff responded: 
I was under the impression, because I read 
that, or that little booklet they gave with 
us, and I, I didn't know, of course they say 
ignorance is no excuse either, but I didn't 
know I was supposed to put down work down there 
unless I was getting paid for it. And that's 
why I put none. Because if I would have been, 
if the would have said no, we don't want ou, 
out o two weeks, t en I' have been outta 
unemployment for two weeks too. {R.0015) 
{Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the evidence is substantial and compelling that 
Plaintiff intentionally withheld the fact of his work and 
earnings to obtain unemployment benefits to which he knew he 
was not entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff knew that work and earnings should be reported 
to the Commission. He received and cashed a paycheck for work 
14 
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performed during the weeks in question. Despite that knowledge 
and just four days after cashing his first paycheck, Plaintiff 
certified to the Commission that he had no work or earnings. 
Plaintiff's contentions that Section 35-4-S(e), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, has been previously interpreted in 
error are ~ithout merit. Therefore, the decision of the 
Commission should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
15 
day of September, 1979. 
BY: 
ROBERT B, HANSEN) 
Attorney General 
FLOYD G, ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
K. Allan Zabel 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Defendant's Brief to Merlin G. Calver, Attorney for 
Plaintiff,2651 Washington Boulevard, Suite No. 9, Ogden, Utah, 
84401, this day of September, 1979. 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
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